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WHEN OSCAR WILDE wrote in 1891 that "life imitates art" and 
that "lying, the telling of beautiful, untrue things, is the proper aim 
of art," he hardly could have foreseen the extent to which much 
of postmodern literary theory would be predicated on that very 
principle : reality and truth are the illusions produced when sys-
tems of discourse (especially artistic discourse) impinge on human 
consciousness. In practice, this has led postmodern novelists to 
strive to undermine hermeneutic responses to art by foregrounding 
the discourse that informs their artifact, thereby implying that not 
only is the final "meaning" of a work of art forever unknowable, 
but also any orthodox truth is actually a discourse-generated fluke. 
Indeed, to a postmodernist, truth is a term that has meaning only 
for those who have an unshakeable faith in some form of divinity, 
or for those who have (primarily through fear of incertitude) re-
stricted the scope of their vision to such an extent that they let 
their cultural norms stand as the Laws, the immovable corner-
stones upon which existence grounds itself. But there are many 
who, as Woody Allen describes himself, lack the comforts derived 
from either a faith in God or a good denial system; they see that 
the cornerstones are, as though by a collective act of lévitation, 
suspended over an abyss, and that all which is regarded as certain 
or solid is really a delusion that hides the evanescence of meaning. 
This indeterminacy of meaning arose, in part, from semioticians' 
contentions that the so-called conscious mind does not bestow 
meaning on what it perceives to be reality, but rather that the self 
ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature, 2 1 : 3 , Ju ly 1 9 9 0 
58 J A M E S B . S C O T T 
is a product of the systems of signs that operate independent of the 
self's control; Jonathan Culler summarizes this ontological view 
as one in which "the self is dissolved as its various functions are 
ascribed to impersonal systems which operate through i t" (Pursuit 
33 ). In other words, not only is each self just a matrix of intersect-
ing sign systems, but also the five billion or so discrete selves on 
this planet collectively constitute an organic medium through 
which sign systems can exist and perpetuate themselves. This post-
modern view, then, is that consciousness is a consequence of (not 
a producer or perceiver of) a conjunction of systems — a conjunc-
tion which is both arbitrary and protean. There can therefore be 
no such thing as an absolute truth or a Meaning of Life, and yet 
any solipsistic sense of the self as the repository of meaning and 
value is equally a delusion. 
If a novelist were to accept this unsettling premise as valid (and 
if he were not, in consequence, to commit suicide ), then he would 
feel that, in the legacy of Wilde, the proper aim of his art is not so 
much lying as registering the non-existence of truth and the inde-
terminacy of signs. Such a novelist is Julian Barnes "qui pense 
plutôt, lui , pour l'impossibilité de 'totaliser'" and for whom the 
central question is "sartrienne: 'Que peut-on savoir d'un homme 
aujourd'hui?'" (Salgas 1 3 ) . Particularly in his 1984 novel (or 
rather, his trans-generic prose text) Flaubert's Parrot, he evinces 
this conviction that words are empty signifiers never touching a 
final signified and that the self is a creature of discursive forces. 
A t its simplest, the novel could be said to be a response to the ques-
tion, "Which is the real stuffed parrot that sat on Flaubert's desk?" 
(for two different museums boast their ownership of this parrot) ; 
but in answering the question Barnes deconstructs conventional 
narrative structures, not only through the presentation of contra-
dictory-but-equally-valid "answers," but also through the fore-
grounding of the discursive forces that are at work in his characters 
and in his reader. The ostensible writer of the text, Geoffrey Braith-
waite, plays a diversity of literary roles — biographer, scholarly 
essayist, omniscient narrator, existential philosopher — and as such 
he underscores Barnes's central premise that identity is a mercurial 
consequence of discourse. 
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Barnes repeatedly stresses the arbitrariness and subjectivity and 
transience of signs. For example, in the chapter "narrated" by 
Flaubert's paramour Louise Colet, she discusses the structure of 
floral discourse (that is, white, pink, and blue convolvuli "signify" 
different "messages" [144] ), yet she also concedes that to Flaubert 
such signifiers carried a totally dissimilar signification. A n d the 
flower sent to her from Chateaubriand's tomb initially speaks of 
Flaubert's depth of feeling, until her suspicion that he did not pick 
the flower at the tomb produces different "reverberations" ( 142 ) 
from the flower. Similarly, in recapping the conventional discourse 
of eye-colour (such as, blue is innocence, black is passion [78]) , 
Braithwaite recognizes the imprecision of such language, for eye-
colour is protean, just as the eyes of the model for Emma Bovary 
were "green, grey, or blue, according to the light" (81 ) ; that is, 
her eyes as signifiers carried no unique and final signification. Of 
more central concern to Braithwaite, however, is the imprecision 
of verbal language itself, the uncertainty one has in never knowing 
if any one word produces the same impression in the mind of the 
word's receiver as existed in the mind of the transmitter. For in-
stance, he infers that the words "giant" and "fat" pertained to 
different quantitative conditions in the nineteenth century than 
they do today, and therefore he loses any basis on which to believe 
that the term "redcurrant jam" corresponds to the same retinal 
encoding in him as it did in Flaubert. Therefore, if words are sig-
nifiers that, over time, can dance with a plurality of signifieds, then 
history becomes a fictional discourse whose signification perpet-
ually reshapes itself like a cloud in the wind: "the past is auto-
biographical fiction pretending to be a parliamentary report" 
( 9 0 ) . Braithwaite's search through the relics and mementoes of 
Flaubert's life leads to a sense of purposelessness in the face of 
signifiers that no longer point towards invariable signifieds: "It 
isn't so different, the way we wander through the past. Lost, dis-
ordered, fearful, we follow what signs there remain ; we read the 
street names, but cannot be confident where we are" ( 6 0 ) . 
But it is not only because of the indeterminacy of meaning in 
formerly used words that "we must look at the past through col-
oured glass" ( 9 4 ) , for the meaning that we attribute to the past 
constantly shifts in accord with the data at our disposal. Just as 
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the discovery that E m m a Bovary's seduction coach was actually 
very small means that "our view [of the seduction scene] suddenly 
lurches" ( 9 2 ) , so too does any view of past events change as the 
configuration of signs changes — not that any one of these changes 
could be said to be the truth : 
The past is a distant, receding coastline, and we are all in the same 
boat. Along the stern there is a line of telescopes; each brings the 
shore into focus at a given distance. If the boat is becalmed, one of 
the telescopes will be in continual use; it will seem to tell the whole, 
the unchanging truth. But this is an illusion; and as the boat sets 
off again, we return to our normal activity; scurrying from one 
telescope to another, seeing the sharpness fade in one, waiting for 
the blur to clear in another. (101) 
The past is like an infinitely nested set of Ukrainian wooden eggs, 
such that the appearance of a new datum causes the opening of 
one egg (or past truth), thereby disclosing another egg (or new 
truth ) ; the opening of the eggs, then, only creates a sequence of 
truths, all of which are equally illusive and therefore equally true. 
Part of what Barnes addresses in the novel is the human com-
pulsion to grasp at artifacts and to use these as signifying ends in 
themselves, because of a reluctance or fear to see the artifact as 
merely one component in an endless chain of meaning. Hence the 
museums with their Flaubertian enema-pumps and assorted bric-
a-brac — a memento-mania perhaps best shown by "the believers, 
the seekers, the pursuers who bought enough of it [alleged locks of 
R . L . Stevenson's hair] to stuff a sofa" ( 1 2 ) . Braithwaite both 
recognizes the emptiness of this and is guilty of it himself, seeing 
the statues merely as stainable, erodable, and mass-produced icons 
that had been created in the self-deceptive endeavour to preserve 
the reality of Flaubert himself, and yet his enthusiasm over the 
apparent discovery of letters from Flaubert to Juliet Herbert 
"thrilled" him for they "might help me imagine more exactly what 
Flaubert was like" ( 4 1 ) . Braithwaite's ambition — despite his 
realization that the holes in his data-gathering net preclude total 
success ( 3 8 ) — i s to re-create Flaubert, as though he were work-
ing with a jigsaw puzzle composed of innumerable pieces. 
But the motivation underlying the ambition — "Why does the 
writing make us chase the writer? . . . Why aren't the books 
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enough?" ( 12) — i s only indirectly disclosed in the novel, and is 
perhaps best illustrated through the contrasting epistemologica! 
stances taken by Braithwaite and his wife. Braithwaite contends 
that people can be dichotomized into those who want to know 
everything and those who don't, the search undertaken by the for-
mer being "a sign of love" ( 1 2 7 ) . His dead wife Ellen "didn't ever 
search for that sliding panel which opens the secret chamber of 
the heart" ( 127) and, correspondingly, she kept the "same inner 
chamber of her heart inaccessible to me" ( 1 6 6 ) . She presumably 
realized the futility of ever knowing anyone in totality, for the 
large-holed net of the biographer is little different from the net 
with which one scoops 'meaning' out of another person's con-
sciousness. A t best, this latter net can seine in words, but the in -
capacity of words (with their infinitely deferred meanings) to 
define the final truth of another's existence impels Ellen into a life 
of casual relationships and suicidal despair. Braithwaite, on the 
other hand, committed himself to the search despite his realization 
that, even if he did discover the secret panel to the heart, it might 
not open or, if it did open, it might reveal "nothing but a mouse 
skeleton" ( 1 2 7 ) . Like a Grail-questing knight, the search is all , 
and if ( as in the case of Baithwaite's search for the secret chamber 
inside Ellen ) the search is thwarted by an immovable barrier, then 
the only alternative to life-wasting inertia is a refocusing of the 
quest (in this case, towards Flaubert). 
Braithwaite's reference to searches through chambers with hid-
den sliding panels suggests the analogy drawn by Umberto Eco 
between labyrinths and models of conjecturality. The post-modern 
"space of conjecture" Eco likens to a rhizome pattern which "is so 
constructed that every path can be connected with every other 
one. It has no centre, no periphery, no exit, because it is potentially 
infinite" (Reflections 5 7 ) . The Braithwaites find themselves in 
such a rhizome space (that is, one from which there can be no 
unique exit into full and final certitude), and whereas Ellen aban-
dons the movement from chamber to chamber, Geoffrey realizes 
that motion is meaning (albeit evanescent meaning) and that only 
through the process of searching can one experience the delight of 
love. But Braithwaite also realizes that "love for a writer is the 
purest, the steadiest form of love" because " i f you want to pursue 
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and find him [the writer] — despite edicts to the contrary — then 
it's impossible to know too much" ( 1 2 7 ) . That is, whereas the 
discovery of, say, a wife's infidelity could lead to a "final confir-
mation tha t . . . life was indeed j'ust a gaudy nightmare in the 
head of an imbecile" ( 1 2 6 ) , the "impossible" pursuit of an author 
precludes any "final confirmation" and thus ensures the joy of 
indeterminacy. Braithwaite even contends that he prefers "to feel 
that things are chaotic, free-wheeling, permanently as well as tem-
porarily crazy — to feel the certainty of human ignorance" ( 6 6 ) , 
and to feel that the apparent stability of a boat in a calm sea is a 
transitory state alterable by the next wind or tide ( 8 2 ) . Appro-
priately, the books that Braithwaite finds most "tantalizing" are 
the unfinished works, the ones where the attempts to "enclose and 
subdue the whole world" ( 13) remain without closure. Thus, to 
answer the question, " W h y does writing make us chase the writer" 
(and, one could add, love the writer), the example of Braithwaite 
would suggest that the indeterminacy of words and the endless 
suggestiveness of relics create a quest free from the emptiness of 
final confirmation: "perhaps, like Frederic and Deslauriers [in 
L'Education Sentimentale], we should prefer the consolation of 
non-fulfillment: the planned [but never actualized] visit to the 
brothel, the pleasure of anticipation" ( 22 ) . 
The consolation of non-fulfilment and the impossibility of clo-
sure are, paradoxically, the figure in this novel's carpet. One mani-
festation of this pattern is the occurrence of conditions which are 
contradictory, mutually exclusive, and yet equally viable. A t its 
simplest level, this is seen in the dual definitions of net ( a meshed 
instrument, and an assemblage of holes [38] ), the conflicting per-
spectives on the light over the English Channel ( 8 3 ) , the oxy-
moronic summary of the Braithwaitcs' marriage ("We were 
happy; we were unhappy" [ 1 6 5 ] ) , and the opposing statements 
by Flaubert and Sartre on Flaubert's homosexual activity ( actual 
sodomy versus wishful thinking [100] ). The reader is left with no 
capacity to discern the "true" perspective and thus is forced into 
an acceptance of irreconcilable contraries that, in effect, simulate 
the condition of rhizome space. The epigram to Chapter g (which 
states, in part: "It is not the houses. It is the spaces between the 
houses" [115]) refers to the resonant interplay between presence 
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and absence, such as that in the well-known "trompe l 'oeil" which 
deconstructs Cartesian space : 
Whereas the bottom part of the diagram suggests cylinders and 
the top part a rectangular arch, the space at point A can be seen 
as both a presence (that is, part of the arch) and an absence (that 
is, a gap between the cylinders). There is no "answer" to the 
diagram and a carver would be hard pressed to create such a 
structure in wood, just as any attempt to determine finality in any 
process of signification is alluring but futile. Accordingly, Braith-
waite is intrigued by the power of irony for "it permits a writer to 
be seemingly absent from his work, yet [he is] in fact hintingly 
present" ( 8 7 ) ; irony effectively deconstructs authorial presence 
by allowing the author to be both there and not there. Moreover, 
ironic moments can be multi-dimensional; Flaubert atop the Pyra-
mid of Cheops espying the Rouen business card endows the situa-
tion for us with irony, but "our response shifts" ( 6 4 ) twice as we 
discover that his travelling companion D u Camp set up this dis-
covery by Flaubert and that Flaubert set up D u Camp's discovery 
of the card in the first place: "as ironies breed, realities recede" 
( 7 0 ) . Irony, that is, discloses layers of putative truth and thus 
mirrors the nature of human understanding. 
The subjectivity of "fact" and the pointlessness of precision is 
further underscored by Braithwaite's emphasis on the writer's ex-
emption from the exigencies of verisimilitude. In his denunciation 
of the En id Starkies of the world, with their detection of mistakes 
in fiction, Braithwaite evinces his conviction that literary reality 
is not important. H e does concede that " i f the factual side of lit-
erature becomes unreliable, then ploys such as irony and fantasy 
become much harder to use" ( 7 7 ) , but he also asks, in reference 
to Flaubert's inconsistent colouring of Emma Bovary's eyes, "does 
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it matter what colour they are anyway?" ( 7 8 ) . After all, if the 
registering of empirical reality in an individual's consciousness is 
subject to arbitrariness (both through the nature of words as sig-
nifies and through the variance of ambient conditions, such as 
eye-colour changing in light), then does it matter if fiction as well 
lacks internal consistency? Braithwaite feels, however, that the con-
verse approach — an attempt to simulate in fiction the indeter-
minacy and uncertainty of human existence, such as through the 
provision of two endings to a novel — is only a ploy that can never 
register the vast rhizomic "delta of life's possibilities [so] let's not 
deceive ourselves about the artifice involved" in such ploys ( 8 9 ) . 
Fiction, then, can only mirror conventional reality if it records the 
endless and rather random ramifying by which "we make a deci-
sion —-ora decision makes us — and we go one way" ( 89 ) with-
out ever arriving at a meaningful end or closure. Moreover, even 
the non-fictional presentation of data, such as that in a biography, 
is necessarily an intertextual construct, amere "hypothesis . . . spun 
directly from the temperament of the biographer" ( 40 ), such as 
Sartre's assertion that Flaubert never engaged in homosexuality 
and Ledoux's statement that Flaubert committed suicide ( 1 8 1 ) . 
Braithwaite himself concedes that in his biographical details about 
his wife, "I have to invent my way to the truth" ( 165 ). In short, 
the eight-word paragraph which closes Chapter 4 (following the 
two conflicting accounts of Flaubert and D u Camp's visit to Ther-
mopylae) could perhaps be considered a Braithwaitian maxim on 
literary as well as empirical reality: "What happened to the truth 
is not recorded" (65 ) . 
This fusion in indeterminacy of literary and empirical reality is 
neatly underscored by the text's structure, in which a medley of 
prose genres (which one reviewer labelled "un marmite bouillon-
nante" [Génies 7] ) deconstructs the conventional distinctions be-
tween fiction and non-fiction. The "Finder's Keepers" chapter, 
for instance, is the most purely fictional of all the chapters (and 
could almost stand as a short story about biographers' obsessions), 
whereas others, such as "Flaubert's Bestiary," offer a careful cata-
loguing of biographical detail. Other chapters are devised ( at least 
in part) in such forms as dictionary entries, examination questions, 
metafictional chat with the reader, narratorial reminiscence or 
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introspection, and speculative autobiography. The "Chronology" 
chapter consists of three chronological summaries which neither 
wholly support nor contradict each other (just as the "definitions" 
of Louise Colet [154] provide two different options for a reader 
to choose from). What Barnes achieves by all this is a deconstruc-
tion of prose genre taxonomies as a means of signification; the 
reader is at all times caught between the poles of true and not true, 
so that even the conventional signification patterns (biography 
presents fact; fiction presents fancy) no longer function. This 
trans-generic structure, then, leaves the reader in the same rhi-
zome space as Braithwaite, free from the delusions of fixed 
meaning. 
This absence of fixed meaning is also suggested by the novel's 
emphasis on discourse as the shaper of human self-definition. That 
is, the manner in which one thinks is determined by whatever 
discourse (or system of signification) underlies the cerebration. 
This is perhaps best illustrated in the text by Braithwaite's spurn-
ing of "lonely-hearts" personal advertisements because the writers 
of the advertisements, by adopting the discourse of such advertise-
ments, "aren't telling the truth" : 
The column distorts the way the advertisers describe themselves. 
No one would think of himself as an active non-smoker inclined to 
melancholy if that wasn't encouraged, even demanded, by the 
form. . . . Try as they might, those advertisers are always beaten 
down by the form ; they are forced — even at the one time they 
need to be candidly personal — into an unwished impersonality. 
(95) 
By adopting the discourse of advertisements, then, a writer of ad-
vertisements in effect is a medium by which the discursive system 
manifests itself — in other words, what you read you are. Similarly, 
the "language of bereavement" which is so "foolishly inadequate" 
( 161 ) a means of expressing the depth of one's grief, is just a dis-
cursive system bereft of an authentically human intent. (One 
could even postulate that there are no such things as authentically 
human intents, but only responses to discursive forces. ) Moreover, 
the "Dictionary of Accepted Ideas" (both Flaubert's and Braith-
waite's) depicts how patterns of discourse establish métonymie 
associations that become labelled truths. Even Mauriac's definition 
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of himself in his Memoirs is shown to be just a configuration of 
various artistic discourses: "he finds himself by looking in the 
works of others" who shaped him ( 9 6 ) . Braithwaite likens M a u -
riac's self-disclosure to the reflection of a face on the window of a 
train as it passes through a tunnel, the face being seen "against 
a shifting background of sooty walls, cables, and sudden brickwork 
. . . and though you know [the image's] presence is conditional, 
you feel it to be permanent" ( 9 6 ) . That is, to Braithwaite, human 
existence consists of a temporary physiological presence animated 
by background patterns (or patterns of discourse) —patterns 
whose meaning or purpose is forever beyond the reach of organic 
intelligence. 
Perhaps the best example of the way that discourse can be said 
to impel people into engaging in a specific activity is implicit, not 
explicit, in this text. The discussion of the death of Ellen ( and here 
her "death" shall refer to the process by which she came to be in a 
not-to-be-resuscitated state in a hospital, not to the switching off 
of her life-support system) parallels the disclosure of Oedipus' 
guilt in Sophocles' play. In The Pursuit of Signs, Culler points 
out that, in a legal sense, no evidence is given (to the reader) that 
Oedipus did ki l l his father, but rather the "demands of significa-
tion" — also referred to as "the force of meaning" and "discursive 
forces" ( 175) —produced the event of patricide. In Flaubert's 
Parrot, the same discursive demands for a "significant" death of 
Ellen also could be said to create the suicide, even though at no 
point is it explicitly stated that she committed suicide. Braithwaite 
acknowledges the conventional expectation that his discomfort in 
discussing the death creates the discursive demand for either a 
murder or a suicide ("No, I didn't k i l l my wife. I might have 
known you'd think that. First you find out she's dead ; then, a while 
later, I say that I never killed a single patient. Aha , who did you 
kil l , then?"[97] ), and thus the subsequent hints about despair and 
drug overdoses create the forces that, in all readers' minds, pro-
duce the suicide. Accordingly, when Braithwaite says that "hers is 
a pure story" ( 1 6 8 ) , he accords with Culler's distinction between 
story/fabula and discourse/sjuzhet ( 170-71 ), for Ellen's fictional 
life (her story) presumably traced out a sequence of causally re-
lated occurrences ending in her death, but at the same time it could 
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be said that the discourse ( created by the demands or expectations 
that inhere in a text) produced the suicide. This is not to say that 
the reader's inference of the suicide is important in itself, but 
rather it serves, along with the mentions of other discursive forces, 
to foreground discourse — that is, to draw the reader's attention 
away from a focus on story to a focus on discourse. This decon-
structive condition of having two producers of death (the story's 
tale of progressive despair, and the discourse's demand of signifi-
cation) is effectively summarized by Braithwaite's "point: What 
knowledge is useful, what knowledge is true?" (97 ) . 
The limits of knowledge and the bondage of humankind to dis-
course are succinctly demonstrated through the parrot — or, more 
precisely, through the answer to the opening chapter's question as 
to which museum owns the real stuffed parrot that sat on Flau-
bert's desk. In arriving at an answer, Braithwaite first has to con-
sider the implications of "parrot-ness" ; he initially speculates that 
"the parrot. . . was Pure W o r d " and thus by association the writer 
is little more than "a sophisticated parrot" ( 18) capable only of 
"repeating at second hand the phrases [discourse] he hears." 
Again, because such discourses are tied to systems that are "re-
ceived, imitative, and inert" ( 1 9 ) , they cannot ascribe meaning to 
anything outside their system. The thrice-cited excerpt from 
Madame Bovary illustrates the "sub-stellar" bounds of discourse: 
"Language is like a cracked kettle on which we beat out tunes for 
bears to dance to, while all the time we long to move the stars to 
pity" ( 1 9 ) . Because of this, Flaubert posited his "religion of de-
spair" based on a calm acceptance of the abyss in which indif-
ferent, amoral systems function, irrespective of human needs or 
so-called volition. Ellen could not "outgaze the black pit" ( 181 ) 
and lapsed into despair. But Braithwaite can, like Flaubert, perse-
vere in life above the pit, despite his dream, "like a loop of film 
endlessly running," that he is at a dark, train-less train station 
whose timetable is a blur of signs and which foments in him 
"desolation, darkness,. . . no hope" ( 1 8 3 ) . This sense of being 
trapped in an array of signs from which no escape to full certitude 
is possible is emphasized by the immediately subsequent discovery 
that the two parrots in the two museums were, in fact, arbitrarily 
chosen from fifty possible parrots, just as words have been arbi-
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trarily derived from a system of differences and endowed, through 
convention, with meaning. A n d just as a stuffed parrot is only a 
facsimile of "parrot-ness," so too is a word only a facsimile of 
meaning. Thus, each museum's parrot (that the curator claims to 
be "the real one") is actually an arbitrarily selected facsimile that 
signifies only the conventions attributed to it — functioning, in 
short, as words do. The answer to the question about which is the 
real parrot, then, is that it does not matter, for stuffed parrots, like 
words, are indicators of the rhizome structure in which human 
consciousness finds itself, and the novel's lack of closure is sympto-
matic of our rhizome reality's lack of final meaning. 
W O R K S CITED 
Barnes, Julian. Flaubert's Parrot. London: Picador, 1 9 8 4 . 
Culler, Jonathan. On Deconstruction. Ithaca: Cornell U P , 1 9 8 2 . 
. The Pursuit of Signs. Ithaca: Cornell U P , 1 9 8 1 . 
Eco, Umberto. Reflections on The Name Of The Rose. Trans. William 
Weaver. London: Seeker and Warburg, 1 9 8 5 . 
. A Theory Of Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1 9 7 9 . 
Genies, Bernard. "Un Anglais Flaubert et les Perroquets." La Quinzaine Lit-
téraire i May 1 9 8 6 : 7. 
Saigas, Jean-Pierre. "Julian Barnes n'en a pas fini avec Flaubert." La Quin-
zaine Littéraire 16 May 1 9 8 6 : 13. 
